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The Requirement of Concurrent Majorities in a
Charter Referendum: The Supreme Court's Retreat
from Voting Equity
Philip L. Martin*
I.

INTRODUCTION

During its 1976-1977 term, the Supreme Court aroused much controversy when, in United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey,' it
upheld the use of racial criteria in state legislative redistricting by
New York. At dispute was the constitutionality of categorizing the
electorate so as to give one group of citizens a favorable position at
the polls, a dispute collaterally encompassing the "one person, one
vote" concept. Objections to the decision have focused not on
the intended result of the now constitutional reapportionment
plans-guaranteeing representation for blacks in proportion to their
percentage of the population in an area-but rather on the manner
in which reapportionment was achieved-splitting a religiously
homogeneous neighborhood of Hasidic Jews who were thereby deprived of the opportunity to elect one of their sect as a representative. 2 Nevertheless, the opinion sanctioned reapportionment resulting in weighted voting only within the context of a division of the
electorate along racial lines.
Shortly after United Jewish Organizations, the Supreme Court,
in Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local
Level, Inc. ,' sustained another New York electoral policy which
also had been attacked as a violation of the "one person, one vote"
principle. The result, however, went virtually unnoticed, presumably because racial criteria were not the basis of the reapportionment. Yet, Lockport also requires a critical analysis inasmuch as it,
in contrast to most of the precedents regarding voting equity, approves a dilution of the right to vote.
* Professor of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University; B.S.,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute; M.A., Ph.D., University of North Carolina.
1. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
2. For a discussion of this case, see Martin, The Quest for Racial Representation in
Legislative Apportionment, 21 How. L.J. 214 (1977).
3. 430 U.S. 259 (1977).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 16: 167

In New York, the general powers of county government have been
traditionally exercised areawide by a unicameral legislature which
shares local responsibility with the county's constituent cities,
towns, and villages.4 Under the state constitution 5 and the Municipal Home Rule Law,6 powers can be redistributed between a county
and its subdivisions, and a county charter can be amended, repealed, or adopted forming a new county government if both a majority of the voting city dwellers and a majority of the voting noncity
(town and village) dwellers approve the charter alterations in a
referendum. In 1972, Niagara County submitted to the electorate a
new charter which would have created the offices of County Executive and County Comptroller. No significant changes were proposed
in the county's power to set tax rates, equalize assessments, issue
bonds, maintain roads, or administer health and public welfare
services. Furthermore, the revision did not reallocate any powers
from the cities, towns, or villages to the county government.7
4. The Supreme Court had occasion to examine the unique interdependence of New
York's counties, cities, towns, and villages in Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
5. Article IX, § 1(h)(1) of the New York Constitution provides in pertinent part:
§ 1. Bill of rights for local governments
Effective local self-government and intergovernmental cooperation are purposes of
the people of the state. In furtherance thereof, local governments shall have the following rights, powers, privileges and immunities in addition to those granted by other
provisions of this constitution:
(h)(1) Counties, other than those wholly included within a city, shall be empowered
• . . to adopt, amend or repeal alternative forms of county government . . . . Any
such form of government or any amendment thereof. . . may transfer one or more
functions or duties of the county or of the cities, towns, villages, districts or other
units of government wholly contained in such county to each other. . . or may abolish
one or more offices, departments, agencies or units of government provided, however,
that no such form or amendment . . .shall become effective unless approved on a
referendum by a majority of the votes cast thereon in the area of the county outside of
cities, and in the cities of the county, if any, considered as one unit. Where an alternative form of county government orany amendment thereof. . .provides for the transfer of any function or duty to or from any village or the abolition of any office, department, agency or unit of government of a village wholly contained in such county, such
form or amendment shall not become effective unless it shall also be approved on the
referendum by a majority of the votes cast thereon in all the villages so affected
considered as one unit.
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1(h)(1).
6. Section 33(7) of the Municipal Home Rule Law of New York, Power to Adopt, Amend
and Repeal County Charters, provides:
7. A charter law
(a) providing a county charter...
(b) proposing an amendment or repeal of one or more provisions thereof which would
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A majority of the 55,393 ballots cast favored the new Niagara
County charter, 28,885 for and 26,508 against. But adoption of the
charter required concurrent majorities; while the city voters approved the charter, 18,220 to 14,914, the noncity votors rejected it,
11,594 to 10,665.8 Since the revised charter was not ratified by a
majority of the noncity voters and by a majority of the city voters,
it was defeated. Disappointed Niagara County voters challenged the
New York constitutional and statutory home rule provisions in federal court as a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' A second charter, however, was put to a referendum in November 1974, before the case was resolved. Again, the
noncity voters blocked the proposed changes although a majority of
county voters approved them. 0 Subsequently, the federal district
court, ruling on the first referendum, held that the dual majority
system was unconstitutional, and ordered implementation of the
1972 charter. On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded "for reconsideration in light of the provisions of the new charter adopted by
Niagara County in 1974."12 Finding "no substantial difference behave the effect of transferring a function or duty of the county, or of a city, town,
village, district or other unit of local government wholly contained in the county, shall
conform to and be subject to consideration by the board of supervisors in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter generally applicable to the form of and action on
proposed local laws by the board of supervisors. If a county charter, or a charter law
as described in this subdivision, is adopted by the board of supervisors, it shall not
become operative unless and until it is approved at a general election or at a special
election, held in the county by receiving a majority of the total votes cast thereon (a)
in the area of the county outside of cities and (b) in the area of the cities of the county,
if any, considered as one unit ....
N.Y. MUN. HOME RuLE LAw § 33(7) (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978).
7. The Supreme Court noted that the towns historically had provided their areas with
"major social services that more recently had been transferred to counties." 430 U.S. at 269.
The Niagara County charter referendum, while not explicitly transferring power to the counties, was establishing the framework to make the shift feasible. See notes 51 & 52 and
accompanying text infra.
8. See 430 U.S. at 262 & n.5.
9. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, Inc. v. Ghezzi, 386 F. Supp. 1
(W.D.N.Y. 1974), vacated, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), rev'd on remand sub nom. Town of Lockport
v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, Inc., 430 U.S. 259 (1977). Since the
action sought injunctive relief with respect to a state statute and constitution for deprivation
of rights secured by the United States Constitution, a special three-judge court was convened.
386 F. Supp. at 4.
10. A total of 36,808 ballots was cast with the city dwellers voting 11,305 to 9,222 in favor
of the charter and the noncity voters opposing it by 8,222 to 8,059. Overall in the county,
19,364 voters approved the charter and 17,444 rejected it. 430 U.S. at 263 n.6.
11. 386 F. Supp. at 9.
12. 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
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tween the two Charters," the district court declared the 1974 charter
had superseded the 1972 charter and was "in full force and effect
as the instrument defining the form of local government for Niagara
County."' 3 The town of Lockport, on behalf of its voters, appealed,
asserting that a charter referendum is not subject to the same requirements which apply to the selection of legislative representatives.
II.

THE CONCEPT OF A "ONE ISSUE" ELECTION

The lower court recognized that the issue of constitutional protections in a charter referendum presented a question of first impression, but, reasoning by analogy to legislative elections, it held New
York's concurrent majority stipulation to be unconstitutional because it violated the "one man, one vote" principle." The Supreme
Court did not agree that the "one person, one vote" concept was
applicable in a referendum." 5 This principle, the court noted,
evolved from the seminal case of Reynolds v. Sims"6 which held that
any dilution of voting power resulting from the election of representatives among districts of unequal population is constitutionally
13. See 430 U.S. at 263-64. While the issue of the constitutionality of the New York laws
was being appealed, the appellants, Town of Lockport, et al., instituted state proceedings to
challenge the certification and enforcement of the 1974 Charter. The district court enjoined
the state proceedings. Id. The district court's opinion on remand is unreported. Id. at 264 n.9.
14. 386 F. Supp. at 7-9. The defendent's principal argument to support the constitutionality of New York's concurrent majority requirement was based on the Supreme Court's
decision in Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971). In Gordon, the Court upheld a requirement
that bonded indebtedness and tax increases be approved by 60% of the popular vote; the
rationale was that a state had the right to protect minority interests and those of unborn
generations. The defendants asserted that the effect of the New York requirement was similarly to place the responsibility for fundamental changes in government in the hands of a
super-majority. The district court distinguished Gordon: the New York law did not provide
for a simple super-majority because there was no limit to minority domination, and the New
York law discriminated against and diluted an identifiable group of voters.
15. 430 U.S. at 266. The Supreme Court primarily addressed the issues raised by the
district court's first opinion, although in essence the first and second rulings of the district
court were the same.
16. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Because legislative apportionment involves issues of a political
nature, the courts historically had shown great reluctance to entertain challenges to alleged
constitutional abuses in apportionment schemes. See Martin, The Supreme Court's Quest
for Voter Equality in Bond Referenda, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 25, 25 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Voter Equality]; Note, Political Representation: The Search for Judicial Standards, 43
BROOKLYN L. REv. 431, 431-42 (1976). Not until 1962, in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
did the Supreme Court firmly establish the principle that the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment permitted judicial review of apportionment.
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impermissible since "the fundamental principle of representative
government in this country is one of equal representation for equal
numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or
place of residence within a state."' 7 The Lockport Court contended
that the purpose underlying this basic tenet, consistently furthered
by the Reynolds progeny, is simply that "in voting for their legislators, all citizens have an equal interest in representative democracy,
and that the concept of equal protection therefore requires that their
votes be given equal weight."' 8 Although this mandate has affected
representative elections at every governmental level in the United
States,"9 the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in
using the same equal protection principles to gauge the fairness of
the Niagara County referendum and in failing to recognize distinctive voter interests in such an election.
Manifesting surprise at the lower court's failure to comprehend
the "self-evident" difference between a referendum and the selection of legislators at the polls, the Lockport opinion focused on the
distinction. "In a referendum, the expression of voter will is direct,
and there is no need to assure that the voters' views will be adequately represented through their representatives in the legislature." 0 Not only does the personal participation of the voters in the
decision-making process distinguish a referendum from a legislative
election, but the policy impact of each is also dissimilar. "[I]nstead
of sending legislators off to the state capitol to vote on a multitude
of issues, the referendum puts one discrete issue to the voters."'"
Since a single question is isolated, it can be judicially "analyzed to
determine whether its adoption or rejection will have a disproportionate impact on an identifiable group of voters."2 If an incommensurate effect on a particular group is found, a court must then
address itself to the propriety of a state compensating for the inequity "either by limiting the franchise to those voters specially affected or by giving their votes a special weight." 23 Having considered
17. 377 U.S. at 560-61.
18. 430 U.S. at 265 (emphasis added).
19. In 1968, this principle was applied to all local governments of general powers in Avery
v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), and two years later, special districts were brought
within the rule in Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
20. 430 U.S. at 266.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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these reapportionment practices in the context of elections of special district governmental bodies of limited jurisdiction and bond
referenda, the Supreme Court reexamined the precedents in light of
the charter referendum controversy.

I.

THE RESTRICTED ELECTORATE

Although use of the restricted electorate in the United States can
be traced to colonial times, the legality of the practice was not
reviewed by the Supreme Court until 1965 in Carringtonv. Rash. 4
The Texas constitution prohibited military personnel stationed in
Texas from voting in state elections. The state justified the restriction by asserting an interest in immunizing its elections from the
concentrated balloting of military personnel whose collective voice
could overwhelm a smaller local civilian community. For example,
the state suggested, a local bond issue could fail because servicemen
were unwilling to invest in the future of a community from which
they might soon depart. While the Court recognized residence as a
legitimate means of qualifying the right to vote, it was unimpressed
by the Texas argument and held that "'[flencing out' from the
franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may
vote is constitutionally impermissible.""
2" the Supreme
In Kramer v. Union Free School District,
Court
considered whether part of the electorate although bona fide residents could be validly "fenced out." A New York voter qualification
statute limited individuals eligible to vote in school district elections to (1) the owners or lessees of taxable real property located
within the district, (2) spouses of owners or lessees of the requisite
property, or (3) parents or guardians of children enrolled for a specific time during the preceding year in a local district school. 2 The
Supreme Court struck down the law as a violation of the equal
protection clause. The Court was not convinced that, because a
school district was financed by revenue from a property tax, an
assessment affected property taxpayers more than others, nor that
including parents of school children encompassed all persons who
24. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
25. Id. at 94. The petitioner in Carringtonwas a bona fide Texas resident and precluded
from voting solely because of his military status.
26. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
27. Id. at 623.
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were interested in the educational affairs of their local government.
Thus, the New York classification excluded individuals who were
"primarily interested" in or "primarily affected" by the issue without furthering a compelling state interest.2
Despite its rejection of New York's limiting plan, Kramerwas not
an absolute prohibition on restricting participation; the opinion recognized the possibility that a state articulated goal could be best
obtained by restricting the ballot to those people who were
"primarily interested." The Court emphasized, however, that in
elections of general interest, there must be a compelling state objective to justify restraints other than age, citizenship, and residence
on voting eligibility."
To date, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
DistrictI presents the only example of a compelling state interest
that warrants limiting the franchise to a particular group. California's irrigation management system is governed by a board that is
not only chosen in an election restricted to landowners, but in an
election in which votes are allocated according to land valuation. In
a certain district one corporation was entitled to such an overwhelming majority of votes that an election had not been held for
over twenty-five years. The Supreme Court did not regard this voting eligibility scheme as violative of the equal protection clause
because the voting was restricted to a recognizable group of individuals upon whom the water district's activities would have a disproportionate effect. Funding of the water district projects was by a tax
assessment levied in proportion to land ownership. Thus, the holder
of the most votes was likewise the largest taxpayer and most affected by the benefits and burdens of the district's projects.3'
Furthermore, the Court found that even though the district was
28.

Id. at 630-33. The Court commented that many persons who had a direct and distinct

concern in the decisions of a local school board were unconstitutionally "fenced-out," while
others who had at most a remote and indirect interest in school district affairs were enfranchised. Id. at 632. Thus, the Court did not decide whether a state in fact could limit a
franchise to those "primarily interested" or "primarily affected."
29. Id. The school district asserted that limiting the franchise to those "primarily interested" was necessary because the complexity of the school system made it difficult for the
electorate to understand its operation. Parents and those who were supporting the system
through property taxes were alleged to have enough interest in the system to acquire the
needed information. The Supreme Court did not resolve this issue. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
30. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
31. Id. at 734.
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vested with typical governmental powers, these powers were related
solely to the exercise of the district's primary functions of water
storage and distribution, and that the policies and projects of the
district had a substantially greater effect upon landowners than
upon nonlandowning residents." Having classified the Tulare Water
Storage District as a "special-purpose" governmental unit of relatively limited authority and having determined that its activities
had a disproportionate effect on an identifiable group of citizens,
the Salyer opinion concluded that there was no constitutional conflict in denying nonlandowners the right to vote in the water district
elections.Y
Admittedly, Carrington, Kramer, and Salyer have little direct
bearing on the New York referendum procedure. Salyer provides a
guideline insofar as it approves an electoral arrangement that satisfies the compelling state interest criterion, but its applicability beyond special-purpose units is uncertain.3 4 Yet, a reasonable interpretation of the three cases indicates that voter preclusion is prohibited in the absence of a clear demonstration that an election is of
sufficient interest to a single group. In light of these precedents,
New York's concurrent majority requirement would appear to be
supportable only if the state established a substantial reason for
protecting one group from domination by another. Yet, the Supreme
Court failed to discuss this aspect of the case law in Lockport.
IV.

LOCAL BOND REFERENDA

On the same day that the decision in Kramer v. Union Free
32.
33.

Id. at 728-29 n.8, 730-31.
The Supreme Court's assessment was based on the following facts:
The appellee district in this case, although vested with some typical governmental
powers, has relatively limited authority. Its primary purpose, indeed the reason for its
existence, is to provide for the acquisition, storage, and distribution of water for farming in the Tulare Lake Basin. It provides no other general public services such as
schools, housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything else of the type ordinarily
financed by a municipal body. There are no towns, shops, hospitals, or other facilities
designed to improve the quality of life within the district boundaries, and it does not
have a fire department, police, buses, or trains.
Not only does the district not exercise what might be thought of as "normal governmental" authority, but its actions disproportionately affect landowners.
Id. at 728-29 (citations omitted).
34. The implications of the Salyer case are discussed in Martin, The Supreme Court and
Local Reapportionment: Voter Inequality in Special-PurposeUnits, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv.
601 (1974).
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School Districtwas announced, its holding was extended to abolish
voter exclusion in referenda for revenue bonds issued by a municipal
utility under state authority. In Cipriano v. City of Houm a, 35 a
Louisiana law provided that only property taxpayers had the right
to vote in elections called to approve the issuance of revenue bonds.
The Court stated that since the operation of the utility system affected everyone living in the city, all voters in the city were substantially affected by the issuance of bonds to finance municipal utilities, not just the forty percent of the registered voters who paid
property taxes. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that the restriction against nonproperty owners participating in the revenue bond
election was a violation of the equal protection clause.3
Cipriano did not obviate the need for future litigation over bond
referenda. One year later, City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski37 considered whether a state could permit only real property owners to vote
on the issuance of general obligation bonds which differed from
revenue bonds. With the latter, revenue is secured by revenues from
the operation of the utility; however, property tax revenues are relied upon for debt service payment of the general obligation bonds,
thus imposing a tax burden on real property owners.3 8 The Court
decided that issuance of either type of bond affected the interests
of all voters. The excluded voters, as citizens of the community,
should have had a voice in approving or rejecting municipal improvements. Moreover, the Court noted that the excluded residents
contributed to the retirement of bonded indebtedness through payment of other local taxes and through payment of increased rents
and costs as property owners passed their burden of taxation to the
lessee and nonproperty owner.3 ' Therefore, a general rule was formulated: "Presumptively, when all citizens are affected in important ways by a governmental decision subject to a referendum, the
Constitution does not permit weighted voting or the exclusion of
otherwise qualified citizens from the franchise." 40 While not pre35. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
36. Id. at 705-06.
37. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
38. "[W]hereas revenue bonds are secured by the revenues from the operation of particular facilities and these revenues may be earned from both property owners and nonproperty
owners, general obligation bonds are secured by the general taxing power of the issuing
municipality." Id. at 208.
39. Id. at 210-11.
40. Id. at 209.
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cisely stated, this rule is based on the "one person, one vote" concept as indicated by requiring voting equality in all governmental
referenda.
Following Phoenix, the Supreme Court confronted a "dual ballot
box" scheme in Hill v. Stone." Texas employed this scheme in an
attempt to weight property owners' votes more heavily than those
of nonproperty owners in municipal elections involving the expenditure of money or the assumption of debt, essentially general obligation bonds. The electorate was divided into two groups: voters who
owned taxable property in the district and listed it as such cast their
ballots in one box, while the remaining registered voters used a
separate box. Since an issue "passed" only if approved by a majority
vote of the property owners and by a majority vote of all voters,
property owners exercised a veto power over the passage of a bond
issue or a related matter. Ostensibly, the demand for concurrent
majorities was a constitutionally permissible alternative to the concept of a restricted electorate inasmuch as all voters could participate in the election in the anticipation of having an impact on the
outcome. But, applying the general rule enunciated in Phoenix, the
Court held that the "dual ballot box" policy was nothing more than
a clever attempt to deny nonproperty owners an equal vote in elections which are of interest to all municipal citizens. 2 Thus, the
scheme restricted the vote without serving a compelling state inter44
est13 and violated the equal protection clause.
In the bond referenda cases, the Supreme Court has concentrated
on voter equality and dismissed considerations of the economic interests of property owners and of the necessity for their protection
from excessive taxation through the vote of nonproperty owners.
41. 421 U.S. 289 (1975).
42. Id. at 300.
43. The state sought to justify the rendering requirement on the ground that it afforded
some protection to property owners who, it was alleged, would bear the direct burden of
retiring the city's bonded indebtedness. The Supreme Court had basically dismissed this
argument in Phoenix. Id. at 298-99. See note 39 and accompanying text supra. The state also
relied on Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973), where the Court upheld a state requirement that a voter register his party preference in advance of a general election to be eligible
in the succeeding primary. This requirement was held to further the legitimate and valid state
goal of "preservation of the integrity of the electoral process." Id. at 761. The Hill Court found
Rosario inapposite since the Texas dual ballot box scheme excluded a portion of the electorate
for failing to comply with a state policy wholly independent from the electoral process. See
421 U.S. at 300.
44. For a detailed discussion of the Texas "dual election box" case, see Voter Equality,
supra note 16.
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Consequently, the Court has avoided delving into economic subtleties-a necessary analysis if an attempt were made to prorate voting
power. This focus on voter equality closely corresponds to the approach in the reapportionment cases-in the reapportionment rulings, the objective has been to equalize numerically the influence
of citizens on legislative outcomes, and in the bond referenda cases,
the goal has been to equalize the influence of each voter in the result
of the election. The goal of equalization is accentuated in the
Phoenix rule, but in Lockport, the Supreme Court failed to note its
applicability to the New York controversy over a county charter
referendum which unquestionably affected all county citizens in
important ways.
V.

THE "SINGLE-SHOT" REFERENDUM AND VOTING INEQUITY

The Supreme Court concluded that the decisions delimiting use
of the restricted electorate in special district elections and in local
bond referenda did not resolve the issue of the constitutionality of
New York's concurrent majority requirement in a county charter
referendum. The sole benefit of the precedents, asserted the Court,
lay in their focusing attention on two inquiries, "whether there is a
genuine difference in the relevant interests of the groups that the
state electoral classification has created; and, if so, whether any
resulting enhancement of minority voting strength nonetheless
amounts to invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause."' 5 By placing these constraints on the scope of its
analysis, the Supreme Court rationalized its approval of New York's
concurrent majority requirement for local referenda upon the
unique governmental system used in the state.
A.

Uniqueness of Governmental Arrangement

As noted earlier, general purpose local government in New York
consists of counties, cities, towns, and villages."0 The fifty-seven
counties outside of New York City are respectively divided into
towns, or towns and one or more cities. These subdivisions can
autonomously perform functions and provide services within their
jurisdiction, or they may cooperate in meeting public commitments
45.
46.

430 U.S. at 268.
See notes 4-6 and accompanying text supra.
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with the county, or they may transfer some or all power to the
county government. In short, several possible arrangements can be
set up to carry out the work of local government under New York
47
law.
Taking a rare stance by recognizing the influence of nonjudicial
factors, the Supreme Court analyzed the local government policy of
New York:
Acting within a fairly loose state apportionment of political
power, the relative energy and organization of these various
subdivisions will often determine which one of them in a given
area carries out the major tasks of local government. Since the
cities have the greatest autonomy within this scheme, changes
serving to strengthen the county structure may have the most
immediate impact on the functions of the towns as deliverers
of government services."
Considering the range of standard responsibilities that could be
altered by a new or an amended charter, for example, sanitation,
street maintenance, and waste removal, the Court's assessment of
potential changes in local government relationships is certainly reasonable. The control exercised by the cities over many of their functions logically indicates that any reorganization of the existing governmental structure will noticeably affect only the county or the
towns since only their powers will be increased or decreased.'
The Court, however, was required to demonstrate how the 1974
Charter, 0 which did not explicitly transfer any duties from the
towns to the county government, would have a disproportionate
effect upon the identifiable electoral interest of the towns. The
Court, therefore, noted that the creation of the offices of County
Executive and County Comptroller, in effect the establishment of
an executive-legislative form of government, "would significantly
enhance the county's organizational and service delivery capacity,
for the purpose of 'greater efficiency and responsibility in county
government.' "", The analysis continued:
47.
48.
49.

430 U.S. at 269.
Id. at 270.
See 13 NEW YORK TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 20 (1967).
50. See notes 11-13 and accompanying text supra.
51. 430 U.S. at 270. The Supreme Court's quote was taken from the Niagara County
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Such anticipated organizational changes, no less than explicit
transfers of functions, could effectively shift any pre-existing
balance of power between town and county governments towards county predominance. In terms of efficient delivery of
government services, such a shift might be all to the good, but
it may still be viewed as carrying a cost quite different for town
voters and their existing town governments from that incurred
52
by city voters and their existing city governments.
In other words, the city voters were categorically equated with the
presumed "unaffected" nonproperty owners who were precluded
from participating in bond referenda by the City of Houma, 3 the
City of Phoenix,5 4 and the State of Texas, 55 and with the presumed
disinterested or uninvolved citizens who were excluded from the
elections of Union School District." At the same time, however, the
interests of the noncity voters were defined in such a way that any
charter reforms would have a disproportionate effect on them thus
making the Salyer ruling applicable.57
B.

Are the Community Interests Dissimilar?

If the preceding comparisons are accepted, then the Lockport
decision cannot be quarrelled with. The crux of the matter, therefore, is whether the city and noncity interests are sufficiently different to justify such classifications under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court analogized the
city versus noncity voter interests in the county charter referendum
to the respective interests of voters in annexation proceedings or in
consolidation of school districts. The connection, however, is nebulous-an adequate delineation of the differing city and noncity voter
interests in the charter referendum was lacking, whereas in annexation or consolidation questions, substantial voter interests can be
clearly identified and labeled for separate polling as to their preference. Nevertheless, the Court contended that reorganizing county
Charter of 1972 which on judicial order had been superseded by the 1974 Charter. See text
accompanying note 13 supra.
52. 430 U.S. at 270-71.
53. See notes 35 & 36 and accompanying text supra.
54. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
55. See notes 41-44 and accompanying text supra.
56. See notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra.
57. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
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government in New York involves the same kind of separate and
opposing interests which are produced by proposals to annex or to
consolidate in a governmental system." Writing a unanimously supported opinion, 9 Justice Stewart concluded:
In each case, separate voter approval requirements are based
on the perception that the real and long-term impact of a restructuring of local government is felt quite differently by the
different county constituent units that in a sense compete to
provide similar governmental services. Voters in these constituent units are directly and differentially affected by the
restructuring of county government, which may make the provider of public services more remote and less subject to the
voters' individual influence."°
Whether different voters' interests were sufficiently discrete to
enable a categorization was not determined by the perceptions of
voters in a particular county. Rather, the test of constitutionality
employed by the Court was whether a state has the authority to
distinguish between disparate groups, such as city and noncity citizens, for the purpose of voting on local issues. The Court did not
hesitate to approve New York's dual balloting requirement inasmuch as the legislation did "no more than recognize the realities of
these substantially differing electoral interests."6 1
To bolster acceptance for its interpretation and to obviate a challenge of inequity, the Court emphasized, in a footnote, that the
record did not indicate any preferential treatment had been created
by the state. In fact, the Court was favorably impressed by the
following statistics:
In some New York counties, city voters outnumber town voters;
in other counties the reverse is true. We are advised that of
charters proposed in 14 counties, one failed to obtain majority
approval of the city voters; two (including Niagara County)
failed to obtain majority approval of noncity voters; eight
58. 430 U.S. at 271-72.
59. Chief Justice Burger may have had some reservations as he filed an unwritten concurring opinion.
60. 430 U.S. at 271-72.
61. Id. at 272.

1977-78

Retreat from Voting Equity

failed to obtain a majority vote in either the towns or the cities;
and three were approved by both city and town voters. 2
While the numbers may be impressive, they hardly furnish a complete justification for demanding concurrent majorities to ratify
changes in a local charter. 3 The statistics do not indicate whether
charter alterations have a disproportionate effect on an area's population, nor do they demonstrate that there are groups which have
sufficiently different interests in the outcome of charter proposals.
The only plausible basis for upholding the referendum requirement,
therefore, is the Supreme Court's preoccupation with the unique
pattern of local government in New York; however, the validity of
this rationale is questionable in light of the leading precedent examining New York's governmental structure.
C.

The Unusual Precedent

A bate v. Mundt' is in some ways an apposite guideline for determining the propriety or necessity of New York's concurrent majority
requirement. In Rockland County, New York, the county's governing board for more than one hundred years had been composed of
supervisors chosen from the county's five towns; thus, all county
officials were also town officials. Due to the disparity in population
among the five towns, a mathematical exactness in the representational system was difficult to attain.65 On review of a court-ordered
apportionment plan for Rockland County,6" the Supreme Court accepted an 11.9 percent deviation from population equality primarily
because of the particular circumstances and needs of the Rockland
community.67 The Supreme Court was impressed with the countytown interrelationship and the resulting coordination among the
62. Id. at 272 n.18.
63. Cf. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 186 (1971), where the Court stated: "The mere
absence of a built-in bias is not, of course, justification for a departure from population
equality."
64. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
65. While electoral apportionment must be based on the general principle of population
equality, "[miathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964). Nevertheless, deviations must be justified
by legitimate state considerations. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. at 185.
66. The county's increased population had produced a severe malapportionment. After
the county voters rejected several reapportionment plans, an action was brought to compel
reapportionment. 403 U.S. at 183.
67. Id. at 184.
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towns and county in the all-important fiscal function. The towns
were permitted to prepare their own budgets which were then submitted to the county board. Although the municipalities established
their own real property assessments, the county board equalized the
assessments and levied the taxes. In addition, intergovernmental
agreements were used to manage other public services such as snow
removal and waste disposal.
Acknowledging the significance of cooperation in the administration of Rockland County's governments, the Court espoused the
respondent's argument that the "county's rapidly expanding population [had] amplified the need for town and county coordination
in the future."" While not mentioned in the Lockport case, a similar
historic and functional interdependence probably characterizes the
Niagara County government. Ostensibly, the goal of the charter
referendum was to effect better town and county coordination. 9
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court only referred to Abate v. Mundt
in a footnote,70 without attempting to support the concurrent majority requirement as aiding local cooperation in governmental programs. On the other hand, if governmental needs are different in
Niagara County, Abate can possibly be extended to authorize the
Court to consider situational exceptions which might justify the rule
of concurrent majorities, but the Court failed to develop even this
approach.
D.

The Illusion of Inequality

The Lockport decision did not conclusively prove that the referendum would have an unequal impact upon an identifiable group of
voters. To the contrary, it should be apparent that both city and
town voters have an equal interest in the structure of their county
government. If a difference existed, it surely would be that the city
voters had a bigger stake in Niagara County; according to the 1970
census there were 147,026 city residents in contrast to 98,694 town
residents. Curiously, this disparity was omitted from the court's
evaluation. Even the classification of a referendum as a "singleshot" election which is not subject to the "one person, one vote"
principle in the same manner as a legislative election7 ' does not
68. Id. at 183.
69. See notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text supra.
70. 430 U.S. at 270 n.15.
71. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text supra.
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explain why the demographic differential was not considered in analyzing the New York charter referendum law. Perhaps, the strained
reading of precedents to justify the requirement of concurrent majorities indicates why a comparison of the Niagara County population was neglected in the Lockport opinion.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Among the apportionment decisions that were applicable to New
York's use of concurrent majorities for finalizing charter actions,
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski should have provided the benchmark for
ascertaining constitutionality. Although the Phoenix controversy
arose from a bond referendum, the general rule it formulated applies
to all governmental decisions made through a referendum. In such
elections "when all citizens are affected in important ways . . . the
Constitution does not permit weighted voting ... ."I' Given the
overwhelming number of city versus town voters in Niagara County,
the town vote in a charter referendum is worth more, or to put it
another way, the franchise is weighted in favor of the townspeople.73
Of course, authorizing this policy fits in nicely with the political
science of John C. Calhoun who advocated a sectional veto over
national decision-making.7 4 But as long as the "one man, one vote"
doctrine of Reynolds v. Sims remains viable," the Supreme Court's
decision in the Lockport case is not consistent constitutional law.
72.
73.
74.

399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970). See notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
Id. at 209.
See J. CALHOUN, A Disquisition on Civil Government, in THE WORKS OF
CALHOUN 187 (R. Calle ed. 1854).
75. See notes 14-19 and accompanying text supra.
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